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INTRODUCTION 
The notion of “zero tolerance” policing has been widely discussed in the media in recent 
years and has received considerable support from politicians right across the political 
spectrum both in the USA and the UK. Proponents of this apparently “get-tough” crime 
control style of policing have used widespread public enthusiasm for such initiatives to 
justify their implementation.
2
 Opponents observe this policing style to be invariably 
targeted at poor and excluded members of society and part of a growing tendency 
towards authoritarianism in social policy.
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 This paper proposes that simply dismissing public support for zero tolerance-style 
policing strategies as being part of a reactionary backlash against social reformist 
developments in policing - and wider society in general - fails to address some very 
legitimate public concerns about law and order. Indeed, it is the central proposition that 
such policing initiatives should be seen in the context of an emerging new 
conceptualisation of liberalism that promotes the notion of citizen responsibility in equal 
measure to the traditional demand for rights. The paper examines the socio-political 
circumstances in which different variants of zero tolerance-style policing has been 
introduced in the USA and the UK and the very different attempts to sustain that 
approach in both constituencies.  
 The structure of this paper is as follows. First, zero tolerance-style policing strategies 
are explained and located in theoretical context. Second, contemporary social formations 
in which these policing initiatives have been introduced are discussed. Third, the 
introduction - and attempts to sustain - zero tolerance-style policing in New York City are 
examined. Fourth, the introduction – and attempts to sustain – such policing initiatives in 
various constituencies in Britain are examined. Fifth, it is concluded that “proactive, 
confident, assertive” policing initiatives can be successful but they need to driven by the 
concerns and retain the legitimacy of the community in which they are introduced. We 
start with an examination of exactly what zero tolerance-style policing is.  
 
ZERO TOLERANCE-STYLE POLICING STRATEGIES AND 
THEORETICAL CONTEXT 
The notion of “zero tolerance policing” has been largely associated with the “broken 
windows thesis” discussed below. Its origins nonetheless lie very much in the “just say 
no to drugs” policies of the Reagan administration in the USA during the early 1980s. 
The notion of “zero tolerance” was later applied in other areas of public policy. In the 
USA, the concept became associated with targeting drink driving among teenagers and 
violence and guns in schools
4
 and later with campaigns against domestic violence, sexual 
assault and child abuse in various constituencies including the USA, UK, Canada and 
Australia.   
 In the area of policing, “zero tolerance” is a generic expression that has been used to 
describe a wide variety of what this author has termed “proactive, confident, assertive 
policing strategies”.5 The actual content of the various initiatives has varied with location 
but all have been fundamentally underpinned by the theoretical proposition that a strong 
law enforcement approach to minor crime - in particular public order offences - will help 
prevent the incidence of more serious offences and ultimately lead to falling crime rates. 
Central to this proposition is the “broken windows” thesis developed in the USA in the 
early 1980s by James Q. Wilson and George Kelling two criminologists usually 
associated with the political right.
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 It is suggested that the very existence of unchecked 
and uncontrolled minor incivilities in a neighbourhood - for example, begging or 
panhandling, public drunkenness, vandalism and graffiti - increasingly discourages 
legitimate business and respectable residents while providing a welcoming atmosphere to 
criminals.  
 The influence of the “broken windows” thesis has been readily acknowledged by the 
early pioneers of zero tolerance-style policing, William J. Bratton, the then 
Commissioner of Police with the New York Police Department (NYPD),
7
 and 
Superintendent Ray Mallon of the Cleveland Constabulary in the UK.
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 In support of their 
argument that a positive proactive presence targeting petty offenders on the street can 
lead to substantial reductions in crime, they refer us to the statistics for their localities. 
These show that during the period 1994 to 1996 the official crime rate in New York City 
decreased by 37%  - the homicide rate alone by 50%
9
 - and in Hartlepool, Cleveland, UK, 
by 27%.
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 We should note that George Kelling has distanced himself on numerous occasions 
from the term “zero tolerance”. Nonetheless, his seminal text “Mending Broken 
Windows” - with Catherine Coles - clearly indicates him to be in favour of the notion that 
the police should “take care of the little things and the big things will take care of 
themselves” (a popular bumper sticker seen widely on police cars in some parts of the 
USA).
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 Moreover, it is a text that unambiguously opposes the handing over of US cities 
to squatter camps of supposedly “homeless” people involved in activities on the streets 
and subways that most of us would define as extortion. Furthermore, it provides a 
meticulous and scholarly assault on the civil liberties “industry” that has sought to 
support those groups.  
 While at first sight, this stance might appear to be an unashamedly right-wing and 
illiberal; it is nonetheless a viewpoint very much in harmony with what can be identified 
as an emerging new configuration of liberalism both in the UK and the USA. The 
individual citizen is considered to have both responsibilities towards the general-well-
being of society and the traditionally acknowledged entitlement to rights. It is a notion 
with significant criminological foundations in the increasingly influential idea that the 
rights of victims should be prioritised over those of the perpetrator.
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 In short, from this 
perspective it is acknowledged that both individuals and the collectivities - or 
communities - in which they live have rights. Consider the following quotation from 
Professor Eli Silverman, at John Jay College of Criminal Justice, New York City, as an 
example of that thinking located in the US context: “It is important to note that the 
community also has rights. Successful zero tolerance policing is more in harmony with 
community wishes than is the abandonment of public spaces to those who violate other 
people‟s rights, privacy and passage”.13 
 There are however considerable legitimate grounds for concern about the nature of 
zero tolerance-style policing strategies. Academic opponents have noted a lack of 
convincing evidence to support a direct causal link between such initiatives and the 
apparent fall in the crime figures. Perhaps more disturbingly, they have raised the spectre 
of a return to the failed “military-style” proactive “swamp” policing tactics previously 
pursued in inner-city neighbourhoods in both the USA and the UK and in which 
perceived police partiality and brutality culminated in major public disorders epitomised 
by Brixton, UK, 1981and Los Angeles, 1992.  
 It is highly significant that respected criminologists with links to both ends of the 
political spectrum from both sides of the Atlantic have agreed in their criticisms of 
military-style policing. From the USA, James Q. Wilson - co-author of the “broken 
windows” thesis14 and strongly associated with the political “new right” - has argued that 
increased police activity targeted at “crime areas” can appear racist because black people 
make up a large proportion of such neighbourhoods. Moreover, actual racism leads to 
mistrust of the service by those they claim to serve. Consequently, the information flow 
on which the police heavily depend in order to successfully function as a crime-fighting 
entity ceases and they subsequently come to feel that the local population holds them in 
contempt. The British criminologists John Lea and Jock Young - strongly identified with 
the new political left – have taken the argument a step further and propose that reductions 
in crime that apparently occur as a result of military-style policing may actually be the 
outcome of an unwillingness to report offences on the part of an alienated public.
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 Thus, it has been widely acknowledged that military-style policing amounts to the 
brutalisation of communities that in turn leads to more, not less, crime by the inhabitants. 
Moreover, illegal actions - whether perceived or actual - committed by over-enthusiastic 
police officers provokes younger inhabitants by bringing home to them their own 
powerlessness. This perceived unfair treatment and racism further reduces the flow of 
information from the public, and this in turn compels the police to become still more 
oppressive in order to obtain results. With the loss of support from the local community 
officers come to rely heavily on stereotypes. This accentuates the impression of unfair 
treatment among the residents and the vicious circle is complete. The police become the 
perceived enemy of the community and offenders are secretly or even overtly admired 
and given sanctuary.  
 Therefore, the argument against military-style policing extends beyond normative 
allegations of alleged racism and unfair treatment. Such strategies are identified as simply 
counter-productive: they reduce the quality and quantity of information flow to the police 
that is vital to the detection of serious offenders. At the same time, there is an extension 
of the labelling process: entire communities are labelled “criminal” with the police 
themselves attracting the label “enemy”. Not only do they receive less information about 
criminals and their activities than they otherwise would, they also tend to provoke 
resentment and public unrest. 
 The Scarman Report
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 into the Brixton disorders stressed that all aspects of police 
work should be premised upon the active consent, trust and participation of the 
community. The British public police service thus subsequently sought to undergo a 
transition towards community policing where “the intention was to break the cycle of 
antagonism and alienation that had hitherto existed between the police and some - 
invariably ethnic-minority – communities”.17 
 With the crime figures, apparently forever-increasing, community-policing strategies 
nonetheless - starved of resources and commitment from senior management - appeared 
not to work or satisfy public demand.
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 The solution - for supporters of the community-
policing model - is adequate implementation. By inference, it is preferable that the police 
have a tolerant attitude to minor criminal activity in certain communities than risk further 
alienation and potential serious social unrest. However, it is a viewpoint not widely 
shared among the public. Crime surveys conducted in the UK have repeatedly shown that 
the public want a visible police presence on their streets.
19
 Senior police officers and their 
academic supporters argue however that there are insufficient resources available to 
implement such a strategy. Those police professionals who promise the public otherwise 
are accused of “dishonest policing”.20 It is possible to observe an extremely convenient 
convergence between two discourses. On one hand, there is a traditional 
liberal/libertarian criminal justice perspective that proposes that the police should 
withdraw from whole areas of the social world so that they do not further criminalise 
groups of dispossessed unfortunates. On the other hand, there are the material concerns of 
senior police management with limited resources. There is a most convenient justification 
for doing little.
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 For some years this considered withdrawal from the streets appears to have been de 
facto policing policy in large - predominantly urban - geographical areas of both the 
USA
22
 and Britain.
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 In general, it was an unspoken orthodoxy unchallenged until the 
introduction in the USA of zero tolerance-style policing strategies.
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 However, the latter 
style of policing does not have to be incompatible with the community-policing ideal. 
 The US policing academic Friedmann
25
 provides a basis for theorising a more 
assertive form of community policing that takes account of both the rights of the 
community and the individual: 
 
Community policing is a policy and a strategy aimed at achieving more 
effective and efficient crime control, reduced fear of crime, improved quality 
of life, improved police services and police legitimacy, through a pro-active 
reliance on community resources that seeks to change crime causing 
conditions. It assumes a need for greater accountability of police, greater 
public share in decision-making and greater concerns for civil rights and 
liberties.
26
 
 
 This author has proposed elsewhere that those zero tolerance-style policing strategies 
that aspire to widespread legitimacy and successes are those compatible with this 
definition. The police service takes a proactive, confident and assertive central role in 
seeking to confront and control crime but at the same time is highly dependent upon the 
support and legitimacy of the community it purports to serve.
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 In 1993, Mayor Rudolph Giuliani and NYPD Police Commissioner Bill Bratton first 
introduced a form of zero-tolerance-style policing to New York City.
28
 Giuliani had been 
elected the first Republican mayor in the City for over sixty years that year after a 
campaign strongly focused on the issue of crime and disorder. He appointed Bratton to 
develop policing strategies to deal with these problems, and co-ordinated, himself, the 
activities of other essential city agencies.
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 Giuliani appears at first sight - and has been widely perceived - to be a fundamentalist 
right-wing Republican with a Reagan/Thatcherite agenda based on a marriage of 
authoritarian social policies and free market economics. Bratton firmly locates the 
policing initiative they introduced in terms of an opposition to the post-Vietnam 
liberal/libertarian discourse that he considered had come to dominate US public life.
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Giuliani been himself previously closely linked with the neo-conservative think-tank the 
Manhattan Institute founded in 1984 by Anthony Fischer (mentor to Margaret Thatcher) 
and William Casey (Ronald Reagan‟s director of the CIA). Closer examination reveals a 
more complex situation.  
 New York City is essentially an intensely populated metropolis of fragmented and 
diverse communities that could best be described - to use the language of contemporary 
social science - postmodern in nature. Mayor Giuliani could be considered a new style 
politician who was at least partly alert to some of the implications - and indeed electoral 
necessities - of trying to first get elected and then second govern such a society, albeit 
with undoubtedly strong political foundations in the “new” political right. Before 
examining that notion more closely, it is appropriate at this point to examine the notion of 
postmodernity - and the modernity it aspires to succeed - closer.  
 
MODERN AND POSTMODERN SOCIAL FORMATIONS 
Modern societies are fundamentally mass societies: mass production and consumption, 
corporate capital and organised labour, economically organising interventionist states, 
that aspires to full employment, demand management and public investment in health 
education and welfare.
31
 They are essentially social formations characterised by moral 
certainty and confidence in the explanatory power of grand social and political theories to 
solve the problems of humanity.
32
 There are competing ways of seeing and dealing with 
the world - for example, conservatism, liberalism and socialism - but the adherents to 
these different perspectives believe in the capacity of their particular doctrine to solve all 
problems in society.  
 These grand theories - or metanarratives
33
 are invariably presented as signifying the 
perceived material interests of mass groups or social classes. Modern societies are 
therefore characterised by different political parties of the left and right with each 
purporting to have the solution to all societal problems. They thus seek to initiate 
programmes that satisfy the different class interests of the mass of society, and this has 
been achieved, in the main, through the creation of conditions to enhance economic 
development while at the same time providing widespread welfare provision for the 
workers. 
 During the last quarter of the twentieth century, there were however increasing doubts 
about the survival of the modernist project in an increasingly fragmented and diverse 
social world. Politically, the traditional parties of the “left” and “right” appeared 
incapable of representing multiple interest groups as disparate as major industrialists and 
financiers, small business proprietors, the unemployed and dispossessed, wide ranging 
gender and sexual preference interests, environmentalists, the homeless and the socially 
excluded.
34
 Postmodern politics are thus complex and characterised by moral ambiguity. 
There is recognition that there are different discourses that can be legitimate and hence 
right for different people, at different times, in different contexts.
35
 It is a perspective 
with its foundations firmly located in cultural relativism where the objective truth - or 
more accurately the competing objective realities - of modernity, are replaced by the 
multiple realities or moral ambiguities of postmodernity.  
 The postmodern condition raises all kinds of issues for politicians and the parties they 
represent because few of these varied views and discourses can be located easily and 
exclusively within the traditional boundaries of modernist political thinking. The 
successful politician has to balance the various ambiguities in order to gain a coalition of 
support across a range of issues. The practical implications of these observations for New 
York City will now be considered.  
 
POLICING THE POSTMODERN METROPOLIS: THE CASE OF NEW YORK 
CITY 
New York City is very much a postmodern metropolis characterised by a mixture of 
diverse and fragmented communities with a wide range of interests and concerns. 
Virtually every ethnic group and cuisine available on the planet can be found on its 
streets. The aspiring successful politician has to be aware of the necessity of building 
coalitions between these diverse groups and the need to identify crucial issues that unite 
the widest possible range of interests. The issue identified by Mayor Giuliani was that of 
crime. At the time New York City was widely recognised as the crime capital of the 
world, many of its citizens were scared and they wanted something doing about the 
problem).
36
  
 It was in this context that Giuliani appointed Bratton Police Commissioner with a 
mandate to target crime. The latter enacted this authorisation by introducing a 
computerised managerial or geographical system (GIS) known as “CompStat” into the 
NYPD.  This has been most noticeably used to target „quality of life‟ crimes - the later 
termed “zero tolerance” policing strategy - as a means of recovering the streets of New 
York City for the law-abiding citizen.
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 Throughout this paper, the term “zero tolerance-style policing” has been used. This 
has been done for the simple reason that a zero tolerance-in totality approach is 
impossible to implement. In New York City an extra 7,000 police officers were 
employed, and sophisticated computer crime mapping techniques were employed to 
rationalise the police response, to target specific areas for a limited time. A more accurate 
description of the New York initiative - and certainly all zero tolerance-style experiments 
in Britain, where it should be noted extra resources have not been made available - would 
be selective intolerance of a targeted crime problem.  
 Liberal academics argue that these zero tolerance-style policing strategies have been 
used to selectively target the poor and excluded sections of society in the interests of the 
middle classes.
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 However, while this is a perfectly legitimate observation, it is important 
to note that the targeting of “quality of life” crimes was - at least at its instigation - 
extremely popular with a large cross-cultural section of the population of New York 
City.
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 The crime statistics suggest a substantial reduction in the number of offences 
committed and the police received popular credit for this decline. There have been other 
widely touted explanations for that reduction: fewer young males in the population, the 
end of the crack-cocaine epidemic and a simultaneous desire among young black males 
raised in the ghetto to live longer and therefore stop shooting each other.
40
 Logic suggests 
that these factors must have been influential and this author has argued elsewhere that, it 
is extremely likely that they provided the sociological preconditions for the initial 
widespread public support.
41
 Silverman is convinced the Giuliani/Bratton policing 
initiative precipitated the reduction in crime.
42
  
 Further logic suggests that the extra 7,000 officers on the streets must have had some 
influence on events, a supposition supported by a 23 per cent increase in arrests during 
the initial period of zero tolerance policing between 1993 and 1996. Moreover, the 
category of arrest reflected the strategy of targeting low level, public order and minor 
drug offences. Arrests for misdemeanours rose by 40 per cent; arrests for misdemeanour 
drug offences by 97 per cent. However, arrests for more serious offences (felonies) only 
rose by 5 per cent, although there was a 44 per cent decrease in reported serious offences 
(a 60 per cent decrease in murders, a 12 per cent decrease in rapes, a 48 per cent decrease 
in robberies and a 46 per cent decrease in burglaries.
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 It was this large reduction in the 
crime figures that was – at least initially – widely popular with the population across 
class and ethnic boundaries. 
 Silverman pertinently observes that the black communities of New York City had 
come to demand the same levels of policing traditionally enjoyed by the white middle-
class suburbs.
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 Now at a theoretical level, this should not come as a surprise to observers 
and commentators in the UK. For some years, the findings of self-report crime surveys 
have informed us that it is the poorest sections of our societies - in particular, members of 
ethnic minority groups - who have experienced the highest level of crime victimisation.
45
 
It would thus seem reasonable to assume that the very same people would have a large 
demand for policing. However, this clearly has not been the case. Many other surveys 
have shown that these very same ethnic groups are vehemently anti-police.
46
 This is 
because there has been a widespread perception among black people - acknowledged 
above in the discussion of the views of left and right realist criminologists - that the 
police have been racist. Understandably, they do not want police officers they consider to 
be external to their communities targeting people simply because they are black.  
 A group of people substantially over-represented among victims of crime - a group 
with a legitimate demand for quality policing, black people - have been the regular 
recipients of unprofessional treatment and this has been received as harassment and 
persecution. Law abiding black people at a high risk of crime victimisation have been 
discouraged from seeking help from a perceived racist police force and have developed 
common cause with a delinquent minority in their midst because of a shared status of 
being black and the victims of racism. In short, there is a widespread demand for policing 
among black people but they want professional behaviour on the part of the police.  It 
appears that they were promised more professional treatment from the NYPD following 
the Giuliani /Bratton policing initiative than they had previously enjoyed. 
 Life is undoubtedly hard for many people in New York City. There are a great many 
poor people and a great percentage of these are black.
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 There is a lot of violence, people 
carry guns, many are killed and even larger numbers of black people are processed 
annually by the criminal justice system and a good proportion of these are incarcerated.
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There is a long established history of police brutality involving black people in New York 
City.
49
 Yet, there is evidence that the black communities welcomed the Giuliani/Bratton 
police intervention in a more positive fashion than others previously.
50
 The police were 
seen to use “assertive” practices, but these were being used against people because they 
were criminal and not simply because they were members of a particular ethnic group. 
The police were gaining the respect - and this may have been a very grudging respect in 
black communities experiencing great poverty and deprivation - of the majority of law 
abiding black citizens. The crucial label was “criminal” rather than “black”.  
 It was a central part of the Giuliani/Bratton policing initiative to both tackle police 
corruption and, most importantly, to be seen by the public to be doing something about 
the problem. Bratton sent an unambiguous message to New Yorkers that he was going to 
do something significant about unprofessional behaviour within their police service.
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Problematically, the promise was not to be honoured in the long term and with it 
increasingly went support for zero tolerance-style policing in New York City. 
 Amnesty International noted that police brutality remained a serious problem in the 
NYPD with the large majority of victims from ethnic minorities. African-Americans 
made 50 per cent of complaints against the police lodged during 1995 with 26 percent by 
Latin Americans.
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 Nearly all of the victims in the cases of deaths in custody were found 
to be members of ethnic minorities. During the period between 1993 and 1996 when 
Bratton was Police Commissioner, complaints concerning police conduct rose by 65 per 
cent. In the four years up to 1998, the filing of civil rights claims against police for 
abusive conduct had increased by 75 per cent.
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 Initially, however, the electoral coalition 
in support of zero tolerance-style policing held firm. 
 Rudolph Giuliani was re-elected in November 1997 with a greatly increased majority 
and electoral analysis suggests his tough stance on crime was responsible for his 
success.
54
 Significantly, there was a “Democrats for Giuliani” group committed to 
securing his re-election. This at a time when that party were winning other elected posts 
in the city by large margins. Being seen to fight crime successfully appeared to be an 
excellent means of building electoral support between the very diverse ethnic and other 
interest groups in New York. It was a situation that was not to last. 
 In August 1997, two police officers were charged with assaulting a Haitian immigrant, 
Abner Louima, in a police station toilet. He had a broken broom handle forced into his 
rectum and was subsequently admitted to hospital for two-and-a-half months. One officer 
was sentenced to 30 years in prison after admitting the assault while another, who was 
convicted of holding Mr Louima down, was jailed for 15 years and eight months. This 
author has previously observed that it was significant that the NYPD responded swiftly in 
speedily charging the two officers with assault and taking action against other implicated 
personnel at all levels in the organisation.
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 Mayor Giuliani repeatedly expressed his 
dismay over the incident and professed his sympathy for the victim. He visited Mr 
Louima in hospital and appeared on television in an attempt to soothe tempers among the 
Haitian population. So while there was undoubtedly continuing racism and other forms of 
unprofessional behaviour in the NYPD, at the same time there appeared to be a high 
profile response on the part of the authorities to both do something and to be seen doing 
something about the problem. Police violence against ethnic minorities was nevertheless 
to continue and the public were increasingly to seek redress.  
 In February 2000, thousands demonstrated in New York City calling for social justice 
and law enforcement reforms after the acquittal of four white policemen on charges of 
murdering an unarmed West African man. Amadou Diallo had been hit by 19 out of 41 
shots fired as he stood at the entrance of his Bronx apartment.
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 The following April, 
protestors clashed with NYPD officers during a funeral procession for another unarmed 
black man killed by officers. Twenty-three police officers and four civilians were injured 
in the clashes, and 27 people were arrested on charges that included disorderly conduct 
and inciting a riot.
57
 NYPD Commissioner Howard Safir questioned about these three 
cases showed a distinct lack of sensitivity in a troubled situation: “Those are tragic 
incidents but you have to put them in context. We have six million contacts with the 
public a year. We arrest almost 400, 000 people a year. And you‟re talking about three 
incidents”.58 
 His predecessor, Bill Bratton did not share this view. He proposed was that the police 
should avoid alienating ethnic minorities and - tacitly acknowledging the views of both 
the right and left realists discussed above - proposed that police effectiveness would be 
improved by working with communities. “If the police in 1997 had been pulled back 
from the assertive policing, the community-based policing could have reduced crime and 
disorder and improved race relations. Instead, we have the situations we find ourselves in 
now”.59 
 Mayor Giuliani and Howard Safir stood by their “get-tough” approach, warning that 
anything less would bring back rampant crime and referred to a record of crime reduction 
“envied by the rest of the world”.60 It was however a record becoming increasingly 
untenable for a much wider audience than the Black and Hispanic ethnic minorities. 
 In September 1999, the police were accused of using excessive force when officers 
shot dead a Jewish man, Gary Busch, wielding a hammer. Hundreds of Hassidic Jews 
took to the streets of an Orthodox Jewish area in Brooklyn to protest at the shooting 
chanting, “Jewish blood is not cheap!” The incident put renewed pressure on Mayor 
Giuliani to again defend his police force. He said that he believed the officers involved 
had kept to procedures but Jewish community leaders accused the police of using 
unnecessary force.
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 At lunchtime on 20th June 1998, police descended on Washington Square Park in 
Greenwich Village seeking to serve warrants on small-scale marijuana dealers who hawk 
their product from park benches. The park‟s exits were sealed, trapping hundreds of law-
abiding citizens inside. A Rutgers University professor was detained in handcuffs when 
he tried to leave to make an appointment. “There were a lot of mothers with baby 
carriages and children”, one witness told the New York Times.62   
 A significant part of the New York City zero tolerance-style policing initiative 
involved attempts at regulating various aspects of public expression, including refusals to 
permit processions, marches and rallies. There were number of Federal courts cases 
challenging violations of the First Amendments (the right to free speech). These included 
successful challenges to allow a protest procession by taxi drivers in May 1998, an 
attempt to prevent food vendors from marching against a curtailment of their stands, and 
a declaration that no more than 30 people could assemble at any one time on the steps of 
City Hall. In October 1998 the October 22 Coalition, who were planning a protest against 
police brutality, were refused a permit to march. The decision was overturned by a 
Federal Court judge who ruled that the refusal of the permit had more to do with the 
protestor‟s message than any likely traffic congestion. The City appealed the decision. 
Three Federal court judges however upheld the right to hold the march. In August 1998, a 
permit was refused to hold the Million Youth March in Harlem. A Federal Court judge 
ruled that the refusal was unconstitutional and that the rules in relation to granting 
permits were “breathtaking in their lack of standards”. A later Federal court appeal 
upheld the right of the rally to take place.  
 The policing of demonstrations and marches in the city had been the subject of 
complaints about police concerning violence, provocation, the refusal to negotiate with 
organisers and widespread arrests. Immediately prior to the Million Youth March in 
Harlem the Police Commissioner announced plans to “saturate the site” with police and 
to promptly clear the streets at 4pm. The rally ended in violence when a police helicopter 
swooped low over the crowd and police in riot gear stormed the stage to shut down the 
meeting three minutes after the allotted time for the event had expired. The event had 
attracted 6,000 attendees and 3,000 police.  
 Mayor Giuliani might claim that his zero tolerance policy had brought the crime rate 
down in New York City to near record lows but by early 2000, the early widespread 
coalition of support for the “zero tolerance” policing initiative in New York City had 
been substantially reduced. In April the NYPD was forced to severely reduce the scale of 
“Operation Condor”, a typical zero tolerance-style initiative where waves of uniformed 
and undercover officers had been sent on to the streets to stop and search anyone they 
believed was acting suspiciously. The operation had been a statistical success with 
extremely high arrest rates for minor drugs offences, but it has been a public relations 
disaster. The New York media had been running daily stories of outrage from citizens 
who claimed that police based on ill-founded suspicion had subjected them to public 
humiliation. In the aftermath of the police killing of unarmed security guard, Patrick 
Dorismond, the NYPD announced that it had cut funding for “Operation Condor” by a 
third and redirected the funds to more traditional policing methods such as street patrols. 
Public opinion polls showed that the once apparently politically invincible Mayor 
Giuliani was running a very poor second in the race with the Democratic candidate 
Hillary Clinton in the race to become senator for New York State in September.
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 It was noted above that the successful politician in the postmodern metropolis has to 
balance the various interests of diverse and fragmented communities in order to gain and 
sustain an electoral coalition. New York City is undoubtedly such a metropolis and 
Rudolph Giuliani had in 1993 successfully identified crime control as a unifying concern 
among all communities. Blacks, Hispanics, Jewish, the White middle class, women, and 
mothers with young children had all an interest in serious crime control. The evidence 
suggests at the outset a broad coalition of support for the Giuliani/Bratton zero tolerance-
style policing initiative in New York. Crime levels were high and it would seem that neo-
desperate measures were being quite widely called for. However, as we have seen in the 
above discussion, by 2000 each of these groups had good reason to doubt that the ends 
justified the “get tough” means that were being employed by the NYPD. Consequently, 
the foundations of Mayor Giuliani‟s electoral coalition were falling apart.  Zero 
tolerance-style policing strategies were no longer popular in New York City.
64
 Before 
reflecting further on why that should be the case, we will consider the implementation of 
such measures in Britain.  
 
ZERO TOLERANCE-STYLE POLICING IN BRITAIN 
British zero tolerance-style policing experiments have been introduced in very different, 
but usually metropolitan, high crime locations. Hartlepool and Middlesborough, in 
Cleveland, are two of the few places - outside of London - where a police force has 
explicitly used zero tolerance-style policing in Britain.
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 Following the high profile and 
much publicised adoption of the strategy in Hartlepool in 1994, the number of recorded 
offences was halved, while in Middlesborough reported crime was reduced by 20 per cent 
within six weeks.
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 Superintendent Ray Mallon - widely associated with the introduction 
of the strategy in both jurisdictions - was in late 1997 suspended from duty and accused 
of various counts of improper behaviour.
67 
Zero tolerance-style initiatives have 
nonetheless continued to be used but in a much lower profile fashion by the Cleveland 
Constabulary to target particular crime problems in the area on a short-term basis.
68
 This 
more surreptitious approach to the implementation of zero tolerance-style policing was to 
become increasingly characteristic of all British initiatives while at the same time seeking 
to gain and maintain the support of the local community in which it is introduced.   
 In October 1996, the Strathclyde Constabulary introduced the “Spotlight Initiative” in 
Glasgow.
69
 Concerned at the outset about obtaining support and legitimacy, widespread 
consultations were held with the public.  It was found that people were substantially more 
anxious about the security of their property and their personal safety in public places than 
they were about the possibility of becoming victims of serious crimes such as murder and 
rape. 20,000 stop and searches were made in the first month with an overall reduction of 
nine per cent in recorded offences.
70
  
 Spotlight has remained a long-term initiative that takes a targeted approach to those 
areas of crime identified by the public as being the greatest concern to them. A flexible 
and responsive policing style involves using intelligence sources and technology to target 
problems and their sources. A high profile uniform presence offers reassurances to the 
public and partnerships are formed with other agencies.
71
.  
 In November 1996, the Metropolitan Police, London, implemented a high profile – 
and again highly publicised - experiment “Operation Zero Tolerance”, in collaboration 
with the City of London Police and the British Transport Police, in King‟s Cross. It lasted 
six weeks. The intention was “to target and prevent crimes which are a particular local 
problem, including drug-related criminality”72 and included elements of the New York 
approach of targeting minor crimes such as dropping litter, graffiti, aggressive begging, 
and low-level disorder adapted to deal with specific problems found in some locales in 
London. Police sources suggest a substantial reduction in the number of drug dealers 
operating in the area while independent evaluations showed that 81 per cent of residents 
in the Kings Cross area felt safer because of the operation.
73
  
 The initiative was preceded and succeeded in the area by Operation Welwyn 
established to tackle the problems of drug-related crime and street prostitution in 
partnership with the London Boroughs of Camden and Islington, the respective Health 
Authorities and local Community Action Groups.  The expressed intention of the unit is 
to improve the quality of life for the residents, commuters and people who work in or 
pass through the area, by reducing crime and the fear of crime. In order to target the 
specific issues raised by the public, the unit selects officers from Islington Police Station, 
the City of London and other specialist groups for short-term crackdowns. There are 
thirty-four officers currently working within Operation Welwyn. Two offences that 
particularly concern both the local population and those passing through are street drug 
dealing and prostitution. Long-term initiatives have thus been introduced to tackle these 
problems. Plain-clothed officers specifically tackle the former with the assistance of 
video and photographic surveillance. Between 1992 and 1998, the unit made 598 drug-
related arrests. Uniform officers tackle the problem of prostitution 24-hours a day. Kerb-
crawlers are stopped and have courts summons sent to their home address.
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 The Metropolitan Police have also introduced other longer-term initiatives and short-
term crackdowns against particular offences in specific areas where there is widespread 
public support for these strategies. Launched in 1993, Operation Bumblebee is a now 
force-wide initiative introduced to tackle burglary. Three million explanatory leaflets and 
stickers have been distributed to homes throughout London and raids have targeted 
burglars and those who receive and sell stolen property right across London. The public 
are shown the results of police investigations through the media. Between November 
1996 and October 1997, for example, 145,900 residential burglaries in the capital were 
cleared up and offences fell by 11.5 per cent.
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 Launched in May 1996, Operation Crack Down aims to arrest and prosecute drug 
dealers while diverting users into appropriate treatment. High visibility policing and long-
term intelligence gathering is used to target prominent criminals. Between July 19th and 
August 24
th
 of that year, there were 837 arrests for supply and possession of drugs and 
other criminal offences. In terms of partnership, drug misuse is widely recognised as a 
problem for the whole community and working in conjunction with other agencies the 
police seek to tackle local problems through local crime reduction strategies introduced 
by the Crime and Disorder Act 1998, a highly significant piece of legislation to which we 
will return below.  
 Although these British zero tolerance-style policing initiatives have been far from 
homogeneous in approach there are identifiable common themes compatible with 
Friedmann‟s conception of community policing. First, they have all relied heavily on a 
visible presence of police officers interacting with the public on the street. Second, there 
has been a central focus on the police consulting public, private and voluntary agencies. 
Third, all of the schemes have been demand led introduced in response to public anxiety 
about high levels of crime and disorder and more general concerns about community 
safety.  
 This public anxiety has been very understandable in the context of an increasing trend 
for an over-stretched, resource-strapped, British police service to ostensibly withdraw 
from whole areas of traditional police work by proactively selecting, with crime 
management desks, those incidents to which they will respond. The respected British 
criminologists Rod Morgan and Tim Newburn observe: 
 
At least one chief constable, for a force which sees itself as a front-runner 
in the pursuit of the new [crime management approach], has privately said 
to us that the concept of the community constable is no longer feasible, if 
was ever sensible, and that he could envisage a time when up to three 
quarters of all calls from the public to his force would no longer result in 
attendance by an officer. To the extent that this is so, the public may be 
educated to the view that this shift in prioritising the allocation of police 
resources is sensible and acceptable. But there is substantial room for 
doubt whether the public will be satisfied by any significant diminution in 
the visible presence of uniformed officers in their communities.
76
 
 
 There is no doubt that the British “New” Labour Government elected in 1997 
identified the legitimate widespread concern about supposedly minor crime, incivilities 
and public order offences that plague our communities as a major issue that cuts across 
the liberal/conservative political divide. The Prime Minister, Tony Blair,
77
 and his Home 
Secretary, Jack Straw,
78
 both, prior to gaining office, made highly publicised statements 
supportive of “zero tolerance policing. Subsequently, their flagship criminal justice 
legislation, the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 - placed a statutory responsibility on local 
authorities to work with the police to tackle crime and disorder and to set local targets for 
reducing the scale and prevalence of these social problems. At the time of its 
implementation, the then Home Office Minister Alun Michael said: “What we will do is 
place a new joint responsibility on the police services and local authorities to develop 
statutory partnerships to prevent crime and enhance community safety by means of 
Community Safety Orders. We recognise how plagued many neighbourhoods are by 
continual anti-social behaviour by individuals or groups of individuals”.79 
 
REFLECTIONS AND CONCLUSION 
This paper has critically examined the introduction of zero tolerance-style policing 
strategies in the USA and UK and advanced the proposition that this approach should be 
considered in the context of a contemporary conceptualisation of liberalism that promotes 
equally citizen responsibility and rights. We have seen that these strategies take different 
forms in different locations but fundamentally, all are founded on the idea that a rigorous 
intervention against minor offences helps remove the preconditions that encourage more 
serious crime. It is proposed in this paper that “proactive, confident, assertive”80 zero 
tolerance-style policing strategies can be very much in accordance with this revised 
notion of liberalism. It is a form of community policing that takes account of both the 
rights of the community and the individual, but which is highly dependent upon the 
continuing support of the former to enable it to be - and remain - successful. 
 It was observed that the socio-political conditions in New York City were very much 
hospitable to a zero tolerance-style of policing when initiated by Mayor Giuliani and 
Commissioner Bratton in 1993. The former clearly came from an unambiguous right-
wing political background but was very aware of the necessity of building a very broad 
electoral coalition that inevitably included both white liberals and sizeable numbers of 
ethnic minorities. It was a coalition highly receptive to the targeting of “quality of life” 
crimes in order to restore law and order to the streets. Moreover, it appeared to work. The 
crime statistics pointed to substantial reductions in crime.  
 Initially, the police were to receive widespread popular credit and support for the 
decline in the crime rate. Furthermore, the black communities initially welcomed the 
Giuliani/Bratton police intervention as it promised targeting the criminals in their midst 
to the advantage of the law-abiding majority.
81
 With the passage of time, the level of 
support went into steep decline and the dominant electoral coalition was to fragment.  
Police brutality remained a serious problem in the NYPD and the evidence suggests that 
the large majority of the victims of such abuses were members of ethnic minorities.
82
 
Bratton himself – now the former Police Commissioner – argued that the police should 
avoid alienating ethnic minorities in order to boost police effectiveness but his successor 
and Giuliani remained committed to their “get-tough” approach.  
 Blacks, Hispanics, Jews, the White middle class, women, and mothers with young 
children all had a material interest in crime control. However, eventually members of 
each of these groups were to experiences dubious NYPD tactics and incidents of 
unprofessional behaviour. There is a suggestion here that “get-tough” policing measures 
might be useful – and widely perceived legitimate - in the short-term. Communities seem 
prepared to tolerate such assertive approaches when the extent of crime problem is 
clearly intolerable. When the problem is alleviated, people rediscover their critical 
faculties. Moreover, it may be harder to restrain overzealous police officers from 
breaches of professional behaviour in the long-term. These lessons seem to be very much 
heeded in the rather different British context - and implementation - of zero tolerance-
style policing.  
 British zero tolerance-style initiatives have been introduced in very different high 
crime locations and although not homogenous, all have common features. First, they have 
all been dependent on a highly visible police presence on the street interacting with the 
public. Second, there has been a central focus on the police consulting public, private and 
voluntary agencies in order to gain widespread legitimacy for their initiatives. Three, 
short-term focused “crackdowns” have been implemented to target particular offences 
without an overbearing long-term presence that comes to alienate the particular 
community. Fourth, and – perhaps, most significantly, in view of the experience of New 
York City – all schemes have not just been introduced in response to widespread public 
anxiety about high levels of crime and disorder but have remained sensitive to the 
demands of the community.  
 Thus, we might observe that successful proactive, confident, assertive policing 
initiatives need to be driven by the concerns of the particular community. Police activity 
that is not community driven is not community policing and will not be considered 
legitimate by the community. The police service cannot be used as a blunt instrument to 
help restore some partially and inaccurately remembered monocultural moral certainty of 
modernity. Such an approach can only lead to dissent and probably, serious social 
disorder, and indeed would be an essential defining characteristic of a new 
authoritarianism. A “new liberalism” - as we observed at the outset of this paper - 
promotes both the responsibilities and the rights of all its citizens in equal measure.   
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